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Physician ownership of health care facilities has become a controversial
issue in the national debate over how to control rising health care costs. Propo-
nents of physician ownership contend that investment by physicians in health
care facilities broadens access to health care by increasing the financing avail-
able for such facilities. Critics of physician ownership contend that such
ownership arrangements lead to higher prices for medical services and more
frequent use of unnecessary medical procedures, without improving the quality
of care. In this Article, Professors Mitchell and Scott review the current debate
and present new empirical evidence based on their study of more than 2600
health care clinics in Florida. The evidence presented here indicates that
physician investment in health care clinics is more widespread than previously
believed. The evidence also indicates that physician investment tends to increase
both the frequency of referrals to the clinics and the cost of the services
provided by the clinics. In light of this evidence, the authors argue that current
legislation which prohibits or restricts physician joint ventures is inadequate.
They recommend that future legislation be strengthened to include stronger
prohibitions and restrictions on indirect physician investment.
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Introduction
Significant changes have occurred in the health care sector during the last
decade. Among the most important are the implementation of the Medicare
prospective payment system for hospital inpatient services, the emergence of
competitive alternative delivery systems, and the development of new technolo-
gies that can be used in nonhospital settings.' Another important change is the
increasing number of physicians who invest in or receive compensation from
health care facilities to which they make referrals.2 Federal regulations provide
for severe penalties to physicians who accept payments for patient referrals. 3
Nonetheless, physician ownership of health care businesses to which they make
referrals is not illegal if these ownership arrangements, known as joint ventures,
meet certain criteria.4 Under joint venture arrangements, physicians may
1. For a more detailed discussion, see Judith R. Lave, The Impact of Medicare Prospective Payment
System and Recommendations for Change, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 499 (1990).
2. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES: REPORT TO CONGRESS (1989).
3. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Fraud and Abuse OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 54 Fed.
Reg. 35,952, 35,984 (1991) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001 (1991)). For a discussion of the anti-kickback
provisions, see John K. iglehart, The Debate Over Physician Ownership of Health Care Facilities, 321 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 198 (1989).
4. See Marianne Lavelle, Doctor Ownership, 14 NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21, 1991, at 1. Joint ventures that
are established to facilitate investment by physicians in health care facilities take a wide variety of forms.
Some joint ventures consist simply of contractual arrangements between physicians and the owners of health
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participate in the ownership of clinical laboratories, radiologic imaging centers,
ambulatory surgical facilities, physical therapy centers, home health agencies,
durable medical equipment and oxygen suppliers, lithotripsy centers, renal
dialysis centers, radiation therapy centers, home infusion businesses, and
substance abuse treatment centers.5
Physician ownership of freestanding health care facilities has attracted
considerable attention in the medical literature,6 in the popular media,7 and
among government policymakers.8 Indeed, recent increases in the number of
referring physicians who own health care businesses have attracted the attention
of regulators and lawmakers at both the state and federal levels.9 Critics of
physician ownership cite conflict of interest" and diminished competition"'
as reasons for concern, while proponents argue that such investments by
physicians expand access to and lower the cost of health care services. 2 To
date, both groups have relied on limited and usually anecdotal evidence to
support their arguments. This Article presents findings from a comprehensive
study of joint ventures involving referring physicians. The results indicate that
physician ownership of health care facilities is far more pervasive than previous
studies have shown. 13 The findings also indicate that physicians have often
established more complex ownership arrangements than nonphysician owners,
and that at least part of the reason for the complexity is to circumvent laws and
regulations that restrict physician ownership. Our findings thus suggest that it
may be difficult to design legislation to regulate physician referrals of patients
to a health care business in which the physician or an immediate family mem-
ber has an ownership interest. The survey results also illustrate how ownership
care facilities; others involve ownership by physicians of interests in partnerships or closely held corporations
which own and operate health care facilities. See Joseph T. Sebastianelli, Health Care in the '90s and
Beyond: Practice Structure, Competition, Government Regulation, and Malpractice Concerns, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY (Sept. 1989) (describing structure of physician joint ventures).
5. See Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, Joint Ventures Among Health Care Providers in Florida, Volume
II (Sept. 1991) (unpublished report prepared for the Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board, on file
with the authors).
6. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 2; John K. Iglehart,
Congress Moves to Regulate Self-Referral and Physicians' Ownership of Clinical Laboratories, 322 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1682 (1990).
7. See, e.g., Walt Boganich & Michael Waldholz, Warm Bodies: Doctor-Owned Labs Earn Lavish
Profits in a Captive Market, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1989, at A l; Robert Pear & Erik Eckholm, When Healers
Are Entrepreneurs: A Debate Over Costs and Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1991, at Al.
8. See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, § 6204, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106
(1989); see also Iglehart, supra note 6.
9. See Laurie M. Grossman, Florida May Curb Doctors' Referrals to Linked Clinics, WALL ST. J., Oct.
28, 1991, at B6.
10. See, e.g., Arnold S. Relman, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 749 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Iglehart, supra note 3, at 204.
12. See, e.g., Robert H. Rosenfeld, Market Forces Set Off Skyrocketing Interest in Hospital-Doctor
Ventures, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 1, 1984, at 60.
13. For results of previous studies, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note
2, and Physician Ownership of Health Care Facilities, PHYSICIAN MARKETPLACE UPDATE (Am. Med.
Ass'n), Mar. 1991, at I [hereinafter Physician Ownershipl.
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of joint ventures has been structured to allow physicians to profit from referrals
without violating existing anti-kickback laws. Consequently, this evidence offers
some important insights into more effective ways legislation may be structured
to prevent such referrals. The evidence suggests that legislation that fails to
recognize the complexities of joint venture arrangements and to identify the
individual ultimately controlling the nominal owners of these businesses will
be ineffective at curtailing the abuses associated with the practice of physician
self-referral.
In Part I of this Article we present the debate on physician joint ventures.
We summarize existing federal and state laws on joint ventures and the anti-
kickback laws, and outline the current dispute over the adequacy of present
regulation. Also in Part I, we review previously available data on the prevalence
of physician involvement in joint ventures. In Part II, we describe our survey
and present the survey results. We describe the scope of existing joint venture
arrangements and compare the relative frequencies of complex ownership
arrangements among physician and nonphysician owners. We also describe in
detail two of the more complicated ownership arrangements we observed. These
arrangements highlight the difficulties involved in identifying owners and in
controlling referrals by the ultimate beneficial owners of health care facilities.
In Part III, we present our policy recommendations based upon the evidence
we obtained.
I. The Debate Over Physician Ownership: Arguments and Evidence
Critics maintain that physician joint ventures increase costs, create conflicts
of interest, and lead to over-utilization of services.'4 Critics also contend that
joint ventures decrease access to services because these facilities "cream skim,"
treating only patients with extensive insurance coverage, thereby shifting the
burden of care of indigent patients to competing non-joint venture health care
providers. 5 Critics further argue that these ownership arrangements create a
captive referral system which limits competition by non-joint venture provid-
ers. 6 This lack of competition may adversely affect the quality of services
rendered and result in higher charges to consumers.'7
The potential conflict of interest arising from joint venture ownership is
illustrated by the case of an investor-owned diagnostic imaging center that faces
intense competition for patients. In order to compete with hospitals that offer
similar services, freestanding facilities frequently offer ownership interests to
14. See Pear & Eckholm, supra note 7, at Al.
15. See Joint Venture Study: Hearings Before the Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board (Sept.
25, 1991) (testimony of Mr. T.R. Ruda and Ms. Trinidad) (transcript on file with authors) [hereinafter
Hearings on Joint Venture Study].
16. See lglehart, supra note 3.
17. See Iglehart, supra note 3.
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neurologists, orthopedic surgeons, and other physicians that refer patients for
diagnostic imaging procedures. Although each physician's ownership compensa-
tion is not directly determined by the number of patients he or she refers to the
imaging center, total profits, and hence individual distributions paid to the
physician-owners, are contingent on both the total number of referrals and the
number of procedures ordered by the physician-owners. The owner-physician's
economic interest in referrals may conflict with his professional medical interest
in proper patient care.' 8
Proponents of joint ventures, however, maintain that these arrangements are
necessary adjustments to the reimbursement and practice style changes that
occurred in the health care sector during the last decade. 9 Advocates argue
that joint ventures increase access to new technology,2" increase access to
services to persons in medically underserved areas, provide economies of scale
and scope, improve access to capital financing, and allow diversification of
project risks.21 . Proponents also contend that physician-owners can better
monitor the quality of services and that joint ventures enhance competition. 2
In a recent public hearing on this issue, a physician group which supports
such ownership arrangements reported an example of a joint venture increasing
access to services. Following the experimental success of a lithotripter unit at
Shands Medical Center in Gainsville, Florida, a group of urologists in the
Tampa Bay area invested $20,000 each to raise $1 million in equity. The
physicians then borrowed an additional $3 million to purchase the lithotripter
and to establish the business. The physician investors claimed that no one in
the area was willing to offer this service and that their venture therefore made
this new technology available to patients in the Tampa Bay area. As a result,
patients saved transportation costs and were charged lower fees as well. The
business was so successful that the $3 million loan was paid off in less than
two years and the equity investors were subsequently paid $20,000 annually
for each $20,000 that they had invested. 23
18. See Relman, supra note 10.
19. See Rosenfeld, supra note 12.
20. Arguments for increased access to new technology are generally predicated on the assumption that
Certificate-of-Need regulations limit or prohibit the introduction of such new services by hospitals and other
providers. Certificate-of-Need programs review and regulate expenditures by hospitals for physical facilities,
equipment, and services. They are intended to coordinate and restrict these investments based on what is
deemed appropriate for the community. Certificate-of-Need legislation would prevent the elimination of
services or facilities from certain unprofitable regions and would also suggest which regions should be
permitted to expand their facilities and services. For general background on Certificate of Need programs,
see James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Planning and Regulation Through Certificate of Need:
An Overview, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 3.
21. See Rosenfeld, supra note 12.
22. Memorandum from Federal Trade Commission, Bureaus of Competition, Consumer Protection,
and Economics, to Department of Health & Human Services 15 (Dec. 18, 1987) (comment concerning
regulations issued pursuant to anti-kickback statute) (on file with authors).
23. See Hearings on Joint Venture Study (Sept. 25, 1991), supra note 15 (testimony of Dr. York).
See also Hearings on Joint Venture Study (Sept. 13, 1991) (testimony of Mr.Thomas Mills and Dr. John
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Similar examples were reported for diagnostic imaging facilities and radia-
tion therapy centers. 4 In each instance, critics responded that other non-physi-
cian investors would have provided the capital necessary to establish these
highly technical services in any area of need. These critics reported that,
contrary to the proponents' arguments, physician investors in diagnostic imaging
centers were primarily concerned about the monetary returns on their invest-
ments and were not concerned about the quality of equipment and services
provided at these centers.25
This Part provides an overview of the struggle to identify and address the
potential abuses of physician joint ventures. The first section describes the
history of legislative action in this area. The second section summarizes the
current dispute over the need for more extensive measures. The third section
reviews the limited empirical evidence that was available to assist decision-
makers in their deliberations prior to our survey.
A. Regulation of Physician Referrals and Ownership Arrangements
Numerous laws and regulations reflect the public concern over physician
joint ventures. This Section summarizes the major laws and regulations that
pertain to physician self-referral.
1. Federal Law and Regulations
Since the inception of Medicare and Medicaid, federal policymakers have
expressed concern over the potential conflicts of interest created by joint
ventures between physicians and health care entities to which they make
referrals. The Social Security Amendments of 1972 were the first explicit
policies aimed at preventing inappropriate provider referrals. 26 These amend-
ments outlawed payments for referrals under the Medicare or Medicaid pro-
grams. The penalties for violations of the law included a misdemeanor convic-
tion, a sentence of up to a year in prison, and a $10,000 fine.2 Nevertheless,
the law did not directly regulate ownership of health care businesses.
Scheuren)
24. See Hearings on Joint Venture Study (Sept. 25, 1991), supra note 15 (testimony of Dr. Richard
Sorace and Mr. Ken Scott).
25. See id. (testimony of Ms. Hope Foster, Mr. Zachary Diechtman, and Mr. Robert Karl).
26. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.'92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (repealed
by Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 4(e), 101
Stat. 689).
27. Section 242(b) of the Social Security Amendments of 1972, supra note 26, added § 1877(b)(2)
to the original Social Security Act.
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a. Amendments to the 1972 Law
The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977,28
strengthened and further expanded the scope of this law five years later. The
amendments made it a felony to solicit, receive, offer, or pay any remuneration
in return for referrals of patients or business under either the Medicare or
Medicaid Programs. Such transactions were punishable by up to five years in
prison and a maximum fine of $25,000.29 However, this amended law con-
tained ambiguities about intent that prompted Congress to revise it in 1980. The
revisions stipulated that such conduct was illegal only if the referrals were made
knowingly and willingly.
In interpreting these statutes, courts generally have ruled that physician
ownership of health care entities does not entail a per se violation of the anti-
kickback laws.30 Nevertheless, excessive returns on investment in a health care
facility might constitute a violation of these laws in circumstances where such
returns are provided to induce referrals. In the authoritative case on this issue,
United States v. Greber, the court found that such transactions violate the
Medicare fraud statute if one of the purposes of the payments to a physician
from a diagnostic center is to induce referrals.3 This reasoning was supported
in recent rulings by two federal appeals courts. 32 In both cases, the defendants
were found guilty of violating anti-kickback laws even though there were
several purposes for the payments, only one of which was to induce referrals.
In 1987, Congress adopted legislation authorizing the Inspector General to
institute civil proceedings to exclude violators of the anti-kickback statute from
federal health programs.33 Previous attempts to prosecute providers who were
suspected of violating the anti-kickback laws had been unsuccessful because
the government attorneys lacked the necessary administrative authority to
achieve their objective. This law also required the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services to publish regulations identifying those practices
28. Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn).
30. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 2.
31. United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
32. See United States v. Bay State, 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989) (concerning a hospital employee who
reviewed bids and awarded contracts for ambulance services while providing consulting services to one of
the bidders); United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989) (involving a diagnostic lab and a
community clinic that agreed to share payments for patient referrals made by the clinic). A broad interpreta-
tion of the anti-kickback laws was also adopted in United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985).
The court in Lipkis determined the value of the alleged services (collecting specimens, spinning down blood,
and carrying insurance) was worth far less than the payments from the independent lab; hence, these
payments were viewed as "kickbacks" for referrals. See id.
33. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93, 101 Stat.
680 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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and arrangements that would not be classified as violations of the anti-kickback
statutes.
34
In April 1989, the Inspector General released a "fraud alert" on joint
ventures.35 This document stated that any investment interest, whether or not
it was directly tied to referrals, could violate the anti-kickback laws. The
document highlighted three areas of concern: the method of selecting and
retaining investors, the nature of the ownership entity (whether it was set up
as a "shell" or holding company that provided no services directly), and the
amount invested by each physician, as well as the rate of return on the invest-
ment.
With respect to the first area of concern, the Inspector General noted that
suspect joint ventures include arrangements where physicians are chosen as
investors because they are likely to refer patients to the facility. An indication
of unlawful activity is a provision stipulating that the physician-investor will
divest ownership if he ceases to practice in the service area.
The second area of concern relates to the business structure of joint ven-
tures. Specifically, the Inspector General meant to target arrangements between
two health care providers in the same line of business. For example, in the case
of clinical laboratories, a suspect situation would exist where one entity is an
established provider that acts as a referring lab, and the other provider is
essentially a "shell" lab which performs little or no testing on site. Although
the "shell" lab bills Medicare or some other third-party payer directly for these
tests, the procedures are performed at the referring lab.
The third concern relates to financing and profit distribution. Frequently,
physicians invest only a nominal amount (ranging between $500 and $1500),
but they receive large returns on these investments, often exceeding 100% per
year. Such arrangements are questionable because the physicians are often able
to borrow even the nominal amount they invest from the health care entity in
which they are "investing" and they often repay the "loan" entirely through
deductions from subsequent profit distributions.
Despite these concerns, the only federal regulation that explicitly prohibited
physician ownership and self-referral of patients prior to 1989, pertained to
home intravenous (IV) drug therapy treatments and home health agencies. The
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988,36 prohibited a home IV therapy
provider from rendering services to a Medicare patient if the services had been
ordered by a physician who had an ownership interest in the provider agency.
However, Congress subsequently repealed this provision.37
34. Id. at § 14(a), 101 Stat. 680, 697 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7b).
35. See lglehart, supra note 3.
36. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 203(c)(1)(F), 102 Stat. 683,
722 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395m).
37. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979.
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b. The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act
Because joint venture arrangements among health care providers have
proliferated in recent years, some members of Congress contend that existing
anti-kickback laws are not sufficient to prohibit the increasing prevalence of
fraud and abuse in the health care sector. This concern prompted Representative
Fortney H. (Pete) Stark, chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee
on Health, to introduce a bill known as the "Ethics in Patient Referrals Act"
in February of 1989."8 This bill addressed the problem of conflicts of interest
attributable to "self-referrals," that is, the referral of a patient to a health care
facility or provider with whom the physician has a financial relationship.39
The original Stark bill would have prohibited a physician from referring
Medicare patients to any health care entity in which the physician or an imme-
diate family member of the physician had an investment interest. This prohibi-
tion on referrals also covered any facility with which the physician had a com-
pensation arrangement. The measure would have further prohibited the health
care entity from billing Medicare, the patient, or any other insurer for services
rendered through referrals from physician investors.
The bill was amended in June of 1989 to gain additional support in Con-
gress. The revised bill contained a grandfather clause which exempted physi-
cian-owned entities that existed prior to March 1, 1989.'P However, the confer-
ence committee which finalized the legislation dropped this provision. The final
version, which Congress passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989,41 prohibits physicians who have ownership interests in or com-
pensation arrangements with clinical laboratories from referring Medicare
patients to these entities for testing. This ban on physician referrals, which
became effective January 1, 1992, also covers labs in which a physician's
immediate family member has an investment interest.
The law prohibiting self-referrals exempts certain arrangements. The
exemptions include labs located within physicians' offices, group medical
practices or health maintenance organizations (HMOs), labs in hospitals where
the referring physician maintains staff privileges (provided that his or her
investment interest is in the entire hospital as opposed to the clinical lab), and
laboratories located in rural areas or in hospitals in Puerto Rico. Physicians may
38. 135 CONG. REC. H240 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1989) (statement of Rep. Stark).
39. In his statements endorsing the bill, Rep. Stark commented: "the payment of any remuneration,
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or kind... is illegal.... Unfortunately, clever deal makers
have found a loophole. Referrals schemes are being disguised as 'legitimate' business arrangements, most
commonly as 'partnerships' involving referring physicians, but also as 'consulting' or similar arrangements.
The general intent is quite clear: to 'lock in' referrals by creating a web of financial relationships binding
the referring physician to the provider." Iglehart, supra note 3, at 200.
40. See Iglehart, supra note 3, at 201.
41. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6204, 103 Stat. 2137, 2236 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn). See Iglehart,
supra note 3, for details.
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also own stock in and refer patients to labs that are publicly traded corporations
with assets exceeding $100 million.42 These exemptions could limit the impact
of the law.
The law further exempts from the ban on self-referrals certain compensation
arrangements between physicians and laboratories. These exemptions include
payments from a hospital to a physician employee, payments for leasing office
space (provided such payments are not determined by the number of referrals),
and payments by a hospital to a physician to attract the physician to relocate
within the hospital market area (provided such payments are not tied to the
number of referrals). Finally, the prohibition does not apply to lab tests
requested by a pathologist for another physician if that pathologist supervises
the testing. 3
The Stark legislation further requires all health care entities that bill Medi-
care to report the names and Medicare-provider numbers of all physician-
owners and of all physicians whose immediate family members are owners.
Facilities which fail to report this information are subject to civil penalties of
up to $10,000 per day of violation." Similarly, all claims for referred services
must list the name and Medicare identification number of the referring physi-
cian. The information gleaned from these reporting requirements will reveal
which health care entities are physician-owned and the number of patients
referred to these facilities by physician-owners.45 The most significant weak-
ness in the data collection procedure is that the survey form does not require
disclosure of indirect ownership interests.
Penalties for violations are substantial. Persons who submit claims for illegal
referrals and referring physicians who fail to refund payments for any illegal
referrals are subject to civil penalties of up to $15,000 for each service ren-
dered.46 Cross-referrals schemes and similar arrangements established between
health care providers to lock-in referrals are illegal and are subject to civil
penalties of up to $100,000 for each such arrangement.47 Any physicians
engaging in such violations may also be excluded from the Medicare pro-
gram.48
Since the Stark legislation and the reporting requirements do not explicitly
prohibit referrals by-indirect owners, it may be possible to circumvent these
laws through complex indirect ownership arrangements. Although compensation
in such situations is not directly linked to the number of referrals, aggregate
profits of the venture are contingent on price, total referrals, and utilization.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(c)(2) (1992).
43. Id. at § 1395nn (1992).
44. Id. at § 1395nn(g)(5).
45. See Iglehart, supra note 6, at 1684.
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn(g)(3) (1992).
47. Id. at § 1395nn(g)(4).
48. See Iglehart, supra note 6, at 1684.
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Since the referring physicians can usually control all of these factors, individual
ownership compensation does depend indirectly on referrals and utilization.
c. The "Safe Harbor" Regulations
"Safe harbor" regulations were originally outlined in a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking published in the Federal Register on January 23, 1989."9 In the
draft document, the only stated "safe harbor" with respect to physician-owner-
ship was investments at fair market prices in large corporations (those with
assets in excess of $5 million and a minimum of 500 stockholders). 5 "Safe
harbors" were also proposed for compensation arrangements involving space
and equipment rentals as well as management services that fell within guide-
lines specified to limit abuse.5 Ownership or compensation arrangements that
did not satisfy these criteria would have constituted a violation of the anti-
kickback laws.
After the Office of the Inspector General revised the proposed "safe har-
bors" on the basis of public comment, the Department of Health and Human
Services issued the final version of the regulations in the Federal Register on
July 29, 1991, which became effective immediately.5" Under the new rules,
investors in secondary health care service-providers may be subject to prosecu-
tion and exclusion from the Medicare program unless they meet specific
criteria. First, no more than 40% of an entity's investors may be doctors or
hospitals in a position to refer patients to the enterprise." Second, no more
than 40% of the enity's revenue may come from referrals by such investors.54
However, physicians investing in large publicly traded corporations with at least
$50 million in assets and who were not offered a special deal to invest would
be granted protection.5
The new rules also limit space and equipment rentals, personal services,
management contracts, referral services, warranties, sale of practices, discounts,
group purchasing organizations, and the waiver of beneficiary deductibles and
coinsurance. 6 Yet, as with of the Stark legislation, the definition of "owner-
ship" may not capture indirect investment through parent corporations.
49. See Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback Regulations, supra note 3, at 3090-93.
50. Id. at § 1001.952(a).
51. Id. at § 1001.952(c).
52. See Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback Regulations, supra note 3, at 35,984.
53. Id. at § 1001.952(a)(2)(i).
54. Id. at § 1001.952(a)(2)(vi).
55. Id. at § 1001.952(a)(1).
56. Id. at §§ 1001.952(b)-(k).
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2. State Regulation
The increasing number of joint venture arrangments between health care
entities and physicians who make referrals to and receive compensation from
these facilities has attracted legislative attention in many states. For example,
thirty-six states have laws that prohibit physicians from receiving or paying
monetary or in-kind compensation for referrals.57 These laws are generally
analogous to the federal prohibitions on payments for referrals of Medicare and
Medicaid patients. However, the state anti-kickback statutes are broader than
the federal law since they protect all health care purchasers.
A few states restrict physician referrals to health care facilities in which the
physician has an ownership interest. Michigan, for example, prohibits physicians
from referring their patients to any health care entity in which the practitioner
has a financial interest. 8 However, although this law has been in effect for
several years, it has never been strictly enforced. Pennsylvania recently adopted
similar legislation, but its law pertains only to patients receiving state medical
assistance.59 Under Delaware law, it is illegal for physicians to refer patients
to physical therapy centers in which they have an investment interest. The'
Delaware law further prohibits physical therapists from working for physicians
as salaried employees within the physician's practice setting.6" New Jersey
lawmakers adopted legislation banning self-referrals for nearly all types of
health care facilities. However, existing joint venture arrangements were
"grandfathered in" and thus were allowed to continue operating subject to
disclosure requirements. The only exempt facilities are radiation therapy
facilities, lithotripsy centers, and renal dialysis centers.6
While Michigan is the only state with a complete ban and no grandfather
clause on physician referrals to facilities in which they have ownership interests,
many states have laws or regulations that prohibit physicians from exploiting
patients for financial gain. Under California law, for example, referrals that are
medically unnecessary, and that are made only because the practitioner has an
ownership interest in the facility, are illegal.62
A number of states mandate that patients have freedom of choice as to
where they receive services. For example, a physician in Missouri can have her
57. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES: FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN
REFERRING PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES: STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS 6 (1989).
58. Michigan's Public Health Code forbids physicians from "directing or requiring an individual to
purchase or secure a drug, device, treatment, procedure or service from another person, place, facility or
business in which the licensee has a financial interest." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.16221(e)(iv) (West
1979).
59. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 449.22 (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. § 1407.
60. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2616(a)(8) (1983) (relating to the practice of physical therapy).
61. S. 3251, 204th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (introduced by Senator Richard Cody to amend Section 2 of
Pub. L. No. 1989. C. 19).
62. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 650 (West 1990)
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license revoked if she requires, as a condition of the patient-physician relation-
ship, that the patient receive drugs, devices, or other professional services
directly from facilities either owned by the physician or associated with her
practice. 6
3
Several states require physicians to disclose their financial interests in
medical facilities to patients under certain circumstances. These states include
Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.' The stringency of the disclosure
laws, however, varies significantly among the states. In Pennsylvania and
Virginia, the disclosure laws apply to any financial interest in a health care
facility to which the physician makes a referral. Physicians must also inform
their patients that they may obtain services at another facility if they so
choose.65 Under Florida law, referring health care practitioners are required
to disclose any financial interest in a joint venture involving the provision of
medicinal drugs or physical therapy to their patients in advance and in writ-
ing.6 Florida law also contains a general disclosure law for physicians. How-
ever, this statute only applies to equity interests exceeding 10%.67 Minnesota
law also requires physicians to disclose financial interests to their patients in
advance and in writing.68 The Minnesota law further stipulates that the disclo-
sure statement must inform the patient that he is free to obtain care else-
where.69 The effectiveness of all these state requirements is limited because
the laws apply only to equity ownership in the business that exceeds threshold
levels of 5 or 10%70
B. The Current Debate
1. Current Deliberations by Policymakers
Congress is currently conducting hearings to examine the possibility of
extending the prohibition on the referral of Medicare patients to physician
owned clinical laboratories to include other health care facilities. However, at
the time of publication, no bills that would further restrict physician self-referral
have been introduced at the federal level. Concurrently, some states are contem-
plating the adoption of a similar prohibition on physician referrals at the state
level. For example, the Florida legislature recently passed a bill which prohibits
63. 1989 Mo. Legis. Serv. 334.100(2)(21) (Vernon).
64. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 57, at 5.
65, 35 PA. CONS. STAT., at § 449.22 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2964 (Michie 1991).
66, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 455.25 (Harrison Supp. 1991).
67, Id. at ch. 458,327(2)(c).
68, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14 7.091(p)( 3 )-( 4 ) (West 1989).
69, Id. at § 147.091(p)(4).
70 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 2.
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centers, physical therapy facilities, and radiation therapy facilities in which the
physician or an immediate family member has either a direct or indirect owner-
ship interest.7 Under the new law, physician owners of existing joint ventures
in these designated health care facilities must either divest their ownership
interests or cease referring to these facilities prior to October, 1995.72 The
legislation also caps fees for designated services at 115% of the Medicare
limiting charge for non-participating physicians providing such services.73
Hence, these guidelines now impose limitations on the number of referrals and
the percentage of revenues generated by physician owners. Finally, the new law
imposes severe monetary penalties for violations.74 The New York and Cali-
fornia legislatures will be considering similar bills which would prohibit
physician referrals to any health care facility in which the physician or an
immediate family member has an investment interest. 75 The continuing wide-
spread attention regarding issues surrounding physician self-referral is unlikely
to diminish until policymakers make more progress toward solving the problem.
2. The Position of Physician Organizations
The American Medical Association (AMA) initially opposed Representative
Stark's Ethics in Patient Referrals Bill.76 The AMA pointed out that most of
the evidence cited by Stark was anecdotal. Although the AMA expressed
concern about the ethical conflicts of interest presented by physician self-
referral, they opposed a complete ban on physician investment in such circum-
stances. The AMA contended such prohibitions were anti-competitive, could
curtail access to care, and could adversely affect quality. Instead, the position
of the AMA was that the referral of patients to facilities in which the physician
had an investment interest was allowable subject to specific criteria. First, the
physician was required to notify the patient of her investment interest. Second,
the physician was required to inform the patient that the recommended services
could be obtained at another facility. Third, the physician's primary concern
had to be for the patient; exploitation for financial gain was considered contrary
to the ethics of the medical profession.77
71. See Fla. H.R. 955, 1992 Reg. Sess. (codification no. 92-178) (creating Patient Self-Referral Act
of 1992).
72. Id. at § 15.
73. Id. at § 16; see also id. at § 11(2) (codified at § 407.60 Fla. Stat.) for regulation dealing specifically
with fee cap for radiation therapy procedures.
74. Id. at §§ 7(e) and (f).
75. Robert Pear, Florida Expected to Ban Referrals by'Doctors to Clinics They Own, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
6, 1992, at A20.
76. See Iglehart, supra note 3, at 203.
77. See James S. Todd & Janet K. Horan, Physician Referral-The AMA View, 262 JAMA 285, 395-96
(1989).
502
Vol. 9: 489, 1992
Physician Joint Ventures
In December 1991, the AMA adopted a new policy regarding the practice
of physician self-referral. The current policy is that physicians with investment
interests in health care businesses outside their office practice should not refer
patients to these facilities unless the physician provides care or services at that
facility, or unless "there is a demonstrated need in the community for the
facility and alternative financing is not available."78 In adopting this policy,
the AMA emphasized that a physician's professional obligation is to the well-
being of his or her patients and that the financial interest created by joint
ventures results in at least the appearance of a conflict of interest. The only
joint ventures permissible under the new AMA guidelines are facilities estab-
lished because there is a demonstrated need in the community and alternative
financing is not available. In such exceptional circumstances, the guidelines
provide strict limitations on the allowable monetary returns to physician-owners
and stringent requirements for disclosure to patients, third party payers, and
eligible investors. In adopting this policy, the AMA cited the Florida study as
persuasive evidence of the problems that may arise when referring physicians
own health care businesses.79
Representatives of both the American College of Surgeons and the Ameri-
can College of Radiology opposed the practice of self-referral in medicine
during the 1989 Congressional hearings.80 Both groups argued that referral
for profit is unethical and is not in the best interest of the patient. Both organi-
zations supported legislation banning the practice of self-referral. 81 Dr. Arnold
Relman, former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, adamantly
expressed similar views. 82 He argued that since the physicians do not supervise
or provide these services directly, self-referrals encourage unnecessary duplica-
tion and over-utilization of facilities and service, thereby adding significantly
to the costs of health care.83
3. Positions of Other Health Related Organizations
Many consumer groups, nonphysician health related professionals, health
insurers, and health care businesses have expressed concern over the conflicts
of interest arising from the practice of physician self-referral. Most of these
organizations favor the enactment of more encompassing legislation to prohibit
physician owners from referring patients to health care facilities in which they
have an investment interest. These organizations include the American Physical
78. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS
6 (1991) (unpublished report, on file with the author).
79. See id. at 2.
80. See lglehart, supra note 3, at 203.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 204.
83. Id.
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Therapy Association, the Blue Cross-Blue Shield Association, the Health
Insurance Association, the National Association of Medical Equipment Suppli-
ers, and the American Association of Retired Persons." They oppose physi-
cian ownership of freestanding health care facilities because it creates a captive
referral system between physician-owners and these entities. These groups
maintain that under such circumstances, non-joint venture facilities find it
difficult to compete, even though they may offer lower prices and comparable
or superior care.85
C. Existing Evidence on Joint Venture Ownership
1. Federal Studies
Two congressionally-mandated studies have evaluated the prevalence and
effects of physician ownership of health care entities to which they make
referrals. Both studies collected information identifying Medicare-provider
physician-owners of health care'entities. Such information is not available from
Medicare carriers, state governments, or the federal government.
a. The Office of the Inspector General's Study
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted two surveys of health
care providers in eight states to determine the prevalence, nature, and impact
of physician ownership of medical businesses to which they make referrals.86
The states examined were Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Michigan,
New York, West Virginia, and Missouri. The survey of physicians indicates
that 12% of the physicians who bill Medicare have ownership interests in
facilities to which they make referrals. 87 The results further suggest that about
8% of the physicians who bill Medicare have some non-ownership type of
compensation arrangement with one or more of the health care facilities to
which they make referrals.88 The percentage of physician owners in Florida
was the highest of the eight states surveyed; over 20% of the physicians in
Florida were estimated to have ownership interests in facilities to which they
refer patients.89
The OIG study included a separate survey of health care businesses that
provide services to Medicare patients. Estimates calculated from the data show
that, nationally, referring physicians have ownership interests in at least 25%
84. Id.
85. See id..
86. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 2, at 8-9.
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id.
89. Id. at app. B, Table BI.
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of freestanding clinical labs, 8% of durable medical equipment suppliers, and
27% of freestanding physiological labs or imaging centers.9' In the eight states
examined, Medicare patients of referring physicians with ownership interests
received significantly more clinical laboratory services and significantly more
diagnostic imaging services than the general population of Medicare beneficia-
ries.9 Although this study reported no overall difference in utilization rates
of durable medical equipment between Medicare patients of physician owners
and the general population of Medicare beneficiaries, significant variation was
found on a state by state basis.92
b. The General Accounting Office Study
During the congressional hearings on the Stark bill, Michael Zimmerman,
director of Medicare and Medicaid issues for the General Accounting Office
(GAO), presented preliminary results from a study focusing on physician
referrals to clinical laboratories and diagnostic imaging centers in Maryland and
Pennsylvania.93 Preliminary figures suggested that about 18% of the freestand-
ing clinical labs and imaging centers in Maryland are owned by one or more
physicians in specialties not providing consultative services for these health care
entities (pathologists render clinical laboratory consultative services and radiolo-
gists interpret X-rays and scans at imaging centers).94 In Pennsylvania, refer-
ring physicians own about 29% of the freestanding labs and imaging facilities
in part or in their entirety.95 In Maryland, about 8.6% of the physicians who
bill Medicare have an ownership interest in either a clinical lab or diagnostic
imaging facility.96 Similar estimates for Pennsylvania were not available at
that time.
2. The American Medical Association Survey
Results from a 1990 survey by the American Medical Association show that
about 8% of the 4,000 physicians surveyed indicated they had ownership
interests in private health care facilities.97 Physician owners were more likely
to-be surgical specialists and have net incomes in excess of $150,000. 98 Physi-
90. Id. at 14-15.
91. Id. at 18-21.
92. Id. at 21.
93. Referring Physicians' Ownership of Laboratories and Imaging Centers: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 363 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Subcomm. on Health] (testimony of Michael Zimmerman).
94. See id. at 383.
95. Id. at 383-84.
96. id. at 384.
97. See Physician Ownership, supra note 13, at 2.
98. Id. at 2.
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cians in the South and those in states with regulation or legislation affecting
ownership were more likely to have investment interests in health care facilities
to which they refer patients.99 Physicians were most likely to have ownership
interests in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), radiology, or clinical laboratory
facilities. '
II. The Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board Survey
We recently conducted a comprehensive study, mandated by the Florida
legislature, to evaluate the effects of physician joint ventures on access, costs,
charges, and utilization of health care services in Florida. The Florida Health
Care Cost Containment Board contracted us to conduct the study. When we
began the study in February 1990, the limited available empirical evidence
suggested that nationally from 7 to 12% of referring physicians had an invest-
ment interest in health care facilities to which they referred patients for serv-
ices.'' We found that physician joint ventures were much more pervasive
in Florida; more than 40% of the physicians involved in direct patient care had
an investment interest in a health care business to which they referred patients
for services. 10 2
The results of our study provide compelling evidence that, on average,
utilization, charges, and profits are higher, while access to poor persons is more
limited, when referring physicians own certain types of facilities (clinical
laboratories, diagnostic imaging centers, and physical therapy and rehabilitation
facilities). 13 Further, our study found no evidence that joint ventures increase
access to underserved groups. We should note that, with the exception of
physical therapy services, we did not evaluate differences in the quality of
services. However, in the case of physical therapy and rehabilitation facilities
we found that physician joint ventures generally provide lower quality service.
This conclusion is based on evidence that shows that licensed physical thera-
pists spend less time with patients at each visit in those facilities.,,"
Our results and the evidence from previous studies clearly indicate that
physician joint ventures have deleterious effects 'on the provision of diagnostic
imaging services, clinical laboratory testing, and physical therapy services. We
conclude from these results that physicians who have investment interests in
99. Id. at 2.
100. Id. at 2.
101. See Todd & Horan, supra note 77, at 395.
102. See Mitchell & Scott, supra note 5, at 1-14.
103. These three facility types account for over 60% of physician investors, and for 60% of all joint
ventures in Florida. For other facility types the results were either inconclusive (ambulatory surgical centers,
durable medical equipment suppliers, home health agencies, and radiation therapy centers) or physician
ownership had no deleterious effects (hospitals and nursing homes). See id. at Table 1.3.
104. See id. at IX-5-6.
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such health care businesses should be barred from referring their patients to
those facilities. In our study we found that physician joint ventures were
routinely structured as complex ownership arrangements. Therefore, in order
to be effective, any legislation designed to regulate physician joint ventures
must account for such complex indirect ownership arrangements.
A. Survey Design and Data Collection Procedures
The results we report are based on data we collected for our study commis-
sioned by the Florida Legislature." 5 Since information coneerning the owners
of facilities which provide health care services in Florida is not reported to the
state, we designed questionnaires to obtain data on the ownership and financial
characteristics of health care businesses in Florida. The Survey Research
Laboratory at Florida State University, the staff of the Florida Health Care Cost
Containment Board, and an advisory panel of experts assisted us. We compiled
mailing lists for ambulatory surgical facilities, clinical laboratories, diagnostic
imaging centers, durable medical equipment suppliers, home health agencies,
acute care hospitals, mental health treatment centers, nursing homes, physical
therapy-rehabilitation centers, psychiatric hospitals, and radiation therapy
centers. The survey process consisted of three mailings staged over a three-
month period. We conducted an intensive effort of telephone follow-up calls
to responding facilities to obtain missing data and to correct inconsistent
information reported on the questionnaires.
1. Overall Response Rates
We mailed questionnaires to over 3,000 health care facilities providing
services in Florida. Deleting the "not applicable" and "return to sender"
facilities from the mailing lists resulted in 2,669 eligible facilities. Altogether,
82.4%, or 2200, of the eligible facilities submitted surveys with usable and
consistent information describing the nature of their ownership arrange-
ments. 1°6 The final response rates for the individual facility groups were:
ambulatory surgical facilities (90.7%), clinical labs (80.1%), community mental
health centers (85.1%), diagnostic imaging centers (72.7%), durable medical
equipment businesses (66%), home health agencies (78.3%), hospitals (95.4%),
105. The Florida Legislature required in 1989 that the Health Care Cost Containment Board conduct
a study to determine the scope and nature of joint ventures between health care providers. Under the
enabling legislation, a joint venture is defined as any "ownership or compensation arrangement" that exists
between health care providers. The law requires that the study yield data-based conclusions regarding the
impact of joint ventures among health care providers on costs, quality, access, and utilization of medical
services in Florida. See 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 354.
106. See Mitchell & Scott, supra note 5, at 1-3.
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nursing homes (97.1%), physical therapy centers (83.7%), psychiatric hospitals
(95.7%), and radiation therapy centers (71.8%). 1'°
In order to evaluate non-response bias, we conducted a telephone follow-up
survey with non-respondents frbm the three facility groups that initially had
response rates ranging between 50 and 60%: physical therapy and/or rehabilita-
tion facilities, diagnostic imaging centers, and durable medical equipment
suppliers. The telephone follow-up of non-respondents revealed that non-
responding facilities were more likely to have referring physician owners. °8
2. Complex Ownership Arrangements
A significant percentage of the responding health care facilities indicated
that they were wholly-owned subsidiaries of a parent corporation or parent
partnership. Since such parent organizations may be owned by health care
professionals or health care entities, we surveyed all such parent organizations
to obtain information about their ultimate controlling owners. The follow-up
survey revealed that many of the individual shareholders and partners of these
parent organizations actually are health care professionals or health care enti-
ties.0 9 Failure to recognize the complex ownership structure of these health
care facilities would substantially understate both the total number of individual
physician investors and the number of health care facilities involved in joint
venture arrangements.
B. Characteristics of Owners of Health Care Facilities
The composition of the health care professionals and health care entities
who own the responding health care facilities is presented in Table 1. The first
column of Table I shows the number of direct owners of each facility type,
while the second column contains the number of ultimate owners of these
facilities through a parent corporation. Column three indicates the total number
of owners (the sum of the direct owners and the ultimate owners through parent
corporations.) Of the 10,295 health care professionals and entities identified as
owners (either direct or ultimate), 78.8% or 8112 are physicians. Of the 8112
owners who are physicians, about 21% are indirect owners. Professional
associations owned by physicians are estimated to account for 6.3% or 647 of
all owners; 400 of these professional associations are direct owners of the
facilities, while the other 247 professional associations are the ultimate owners
through a parent organization. Another 3.4% or 351 are health care entity
107. See id. at 1-1.
108. See id. at 1-2.
109. See id. at 1-5 and Table 1.3.
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Table I
Owners of Health Care Entities who are
Health Care Professionalsa
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Notes: 'The term "Health Care Professional" includes immediate family members who have
ownership interests in these health care entities.
'his category includes medical doctors, osteopaths, chiropractors, podiatrists and dentists.
'These numbers exclude professional association owners.
'These numbers are estimates based on 230 professional association direct owners and 118
professional association parent corporation owners. A survey of professional association
owners indicate an average of 2.09 physician owners per professional association.
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owners. Except for health care administrators, the remaining groups of health
care professionals each account for less than 3% of all the owners identified.
Table 2 shows the number of physician-owners by specialty group. The first
column contains the number of direct owners, while the second column indi-
cates the number of physicians who own through parent corporations., Column
three shows the total number of owners. These numbers reflect individual
owners only and exclude professional association owners.
Only 9% of physician-owners are in specialties that primarily provide
services on a consultation basis (pathology, anesthesiology, and radiology).
Since these specialists are generally not in a position to make referrals to their
own facilities, they are classified as non-referring or consultation physicians.
The number and percentage of total physician/owners in these three groups are:
pathology - 154 (1.9%), anesthesiology - 114 (1.4%), and radiology - 471
(5.8%). Although other physician specialties provide services on a consultation
basis, these specialties account for relatively few owners.
The remaining 91% of the physician-owners are concentrated in specialties
which are likely to refer their patients for surgery, diagnostic testing, and other
ancillary services or equipment. A large percentage of these owners, about 35%,
specialize in internal medicine. General practitioners account for 11.4% of the
physician investors, while surgeons and orthopedists each represent about 8%.
Specialists in obstetrics/gynecology and neurology account for 6.8% and 5.0%
respectively. With the exception of the "other doctor" category, each of the
remaining specialty groups accounts for less than 3% of all physician owners.
When one examines only those physicians with direct ownership interests,
one sees that less than 8% (497) of the 6,389, direct physician owners are
pathologists, radiologists or anesthesiologists. Among the 1,723 physicians
identified as indirect owners, about 14% are classified as consultation physi-
cians. Thus, over 92% of the physicians with direct ownership interests and
86% of those identified as indirect owners are concentrated in specialties which
are likely to refer their patients for surgery, diagnostic testing, and other
ancillary services or equipment.
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Table 2
Specialties of Physician Owners of Health Care Entitiesa
SPECIALTY NUMBER OF NUMBER OF TOTAL NUMBER PERCENTAGE OF
DmEcr PARENT OF OWNERS ALL PHYSICIAN
OWNERS CORPORATION OWNERS'
OWNERS
General Practice 796 125 921 11.4%
OB/GYN 454 97 551 6.8%
Internal
Medicine 2354 495 2849 35.1%
Surgery 462 178 640 7.9%
Orthopedics 592 73 665 8.2%
Neurology 314 90 404 5.0%
Ophthalmology 146 52 198 2.4%
Pathology 105 49 154 1.9%
Radiology 343 128 471 5.8%
Oncology 177 37 214 2.6%
Anesthesiology 49 65 114 1.4%
Pediatrics 115 66 181 2.2%
Podiatry 20 2 22 0.3%
Chiropractor 9 - 9 0.1%
Other Doctor 453 266 719 8.9%
TOTAL 6389 1723 8112 100%
Notes: 'Physicians include medical doctors, osteopaths, chiropractors, podiauists and dentists.
Physician owners include immediate family members of physicians who have ownership
interests in these health care entities.
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C. An Empirical Test of Physicians' Choice of Ownership
Structure for Joint Ventures
Individuals who own businesses generally structure the organization as a
corporation or limited partnership in order to limit their personal liability. While
these ownership structures add to organizational and operating costs for the
business, the benefits of limiting personal liability presumably offset such costs.
They often establish separate legal entities for each operating unit of a business
with the purpose of isolating the risks for each unit. In such cases, the owners
may establish a holding company to provide administrative services at lower
costs to the individual operating companies. Absent such cost savings, it does
not make economic sense to establish holding companies, since direct owner-
ship of the operating units via a corporation or limited partnership structure
would already provide the benefit of limiting personal liability. Establishing
multiple levels of legal entities would only add to the costs and would not
provide any apparent offsetting benefits to owners.
I The data presented in Table 1 therefore raise questions as to the frequency,
of "parent corporation" ownership arrangements. Most of these parent corpora-
tion arrangements involve multiple layers of legal entities that necessarily add
to costs, whereas most of the facilities are independent single businesses. Such
complex ownership structures may be a response to laws and regulations which
specifically limit both direct ownership by referring physicians and direct
compensation to referring physicians.
Table 3
Choices of Ownership Structures by Physicians
and Other Health Care Professionals
GROUP DIREcT OWNERSHIP COMPLEX OWNERSHIP TOTAL
Physicians' 6789 1970 8759
Other Licensed Health
Care Professionals 573 19 592
TOTAL 7362 1989 9351
Chi-Square 39.92
(p < .001)
Notes: 'Physicians include medical doctors, osteopaths, chiropractors, podiatrists and dentists.
Physician owners include immediate family members of physicians who have ownership
interests in these health care entities.
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We tested the premise that physicians are more likely to establish complex
ownership arrangements by using the survey data for non-physician, licensed
health care professionals as a benchmark. The null hypothesis was that the
choice of direct versus complex ownership structure is independent of the
physician versus non-physician health care professional status of owners. The
alternative hypothesis was that the choice of ownership is statistically dependent
on the physician versus non-physician status of owners of health care facilities.
Table 3 presents a cross-classification of ownership structure by type of
health care professional. The computed Chi-square statistic is 39.92, which
leads to rejection (p < .005) of the hypothesis that the choice of ownership
structure is independent of the physician versus non-physician status of the
licensed health care professional owners. The data suggest that the proportion
of physicians who choose complex ownership -arrangements is significantly
higher than the proportion of non-physician owners who choose complex
ownership arrangements. While these results do not prove that these choices
are influenced by existing regulations on direct ownership by referring physi-
cians, the results tend to support this premise. The next section provides details
on some of the more complex structures. These structures provide anecdotal
evidence that existing regulations on direct ownership by referring physicians
influence physicians' choice of ownership arrangements.
D. The Structure of More Complex Joint Venture Arrangements
Identifying the individual owners of health care entities can be difficult
because the ownership structure is sometimes complex. Multiple levels of
incorporation or partnership can make it difficult to identify the individual
owners of the parent organization. Failure to recognize the complexity of some
joint ventures and to obtain information on the owners of the parent organiza-
tion means that both the prevalence and scope of joint venture arrangements
are underestimated.
We describe two examples of complex joint venture ownership arrange-
ments, which we observed through data collection, to provide some insights
into how intricate these arrangements can be. While we have changed the
names of the organizations in these examples, the structure of the ownership
arrangements accurately describes existing joint venture arrangements. These
examples illustrate the problems encountered in determining the beneficial
owners of subsidiary health care facilities.
The Yale Journal on Regulation
FIGURE 1
AMSURG LAB IMAGING MEDICAL




corporations - each with
a single owner who is a
physician.
Vol. 9: 489, 1992
Physician Joint Ventures
Figure 1 presents the first example. The corporation MD ASSOCIATES
owns four health care entities that provide services in Florida: an ambulatory
surgical facility (AMSURG, INC.), a clinical laboratory (LAB TESTS, INC.),
a diagnostic imaging center (IMAGING, INC.), and a durable medical equip-
ment business (MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, INC.). MD ASSOCIATES is a joint
venture between two corporations: HCSURG, INC. and VMM SERVICES,
INC. While the ownership structure of HCSURG, INC. has not been deter-
mined, over 200 separate corporations own VMM SERVICES. Each of these
200-plus corporations has a single stockholder who is a physician.
If the objective of this complex structure was to limit each physician's
personal liability, they could have owned the parent corporation (MD ASSOCI-
ATES) directly. Direct ownership would eliminate the costs of establishing and
maintaining the 200-plus corporations. Instead, this complex arrangement avoids
direct ownership and makes it difficult to identify the controlling owners of
these four health care businesses.
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Figure 2 presents an even more complex ownership structure. Three paths
of ownership arrangements can be traced to NFP MEDICAL CARE, INC., a
not-for-profit corporation with a board of directors composed of 100 physicians.
First, NFP MEDICAL CARE, INC. is the parent corporation of NFPH FOUN-
DATION, a not-for-profit hospital operating under the name NFP HOSPITAL.
Members of the board also direct the activities of a trust that raises money from
the public to support the activities of the hospital.
The second ownership arrangement is more complex. NFP MEDICAL
CARE, INC. and a for-profit corporation, also with 100 physician investors,
known as DOCS, INC., jointly own a for-profit entity called MD HEALTH
CARE CORPORATION. Many owners of DOCS, INC. serve as directors of
NFP MEDICAL CARE, INC. The structure of the joint venture is further
complicated by the fact that MD HEALTH CARE CORPORATION owns four
health care providers: CAT SCANS, INC., HOME HEALTH SERVICES, INC.,
DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, INC., and MRI CENTER, LTD. Each
of these entities is a for-profit corporation. Since Medicare currently reimburses
health care facilities for outpatient services, this ownership arrangement allows
the hospital to allocate the overhead costs of providing outpatient services to
the Medicare program.
The third ownership path is also complex. NFP MEDICAL CARE, INC.
owns a for-profit holding company named Fl HOLDING COMPANY, INC.
This company in turn owns three for-profit businesses: a home health agency
(HOME CARE, INC.), a management company (MD MANAGEMENT SER-
VICES, INC.), and HOSPITAL CARE, INC. HOSPITAL CARE, INC. is the
general partner in a joint venture with DOC GENERAL LIMITED PARTNER
INVESTORS. This general partner and these limited partners jointly own MD
HOSPITAL, a for-profit institution that operates under an alternative name, FP
GENERAL HOSPITAL. Furthermore, although not apparent from the chart in
Figure B, some shares of Fl GENERAL HOSPITAL are owned by DOCS,
INC., the corporation controlled by the 100 physician-investors.
The individuals who control these businesses are the 100 physicians who
1) are members of the board of directors of the not-for-profit corporation (NFP
MEDICAL CARE, INC.) that controls the not-for-profit hospital; 2) are the
owners of the for-profit corporation (DOCS, INC.) that is the partner of the not-
for-profit corporation; 3) own four freestanding outpatient facilities in conjunc-
tion with the not-for-profit parent corporation (NFP MEDICAL CARE, INC.);
and 4) own limited partner shares in the for-profit hospital (FP GENERAL
HOSPITAL) that, through several intermediaries, is controlled by the not-for-
profit parent corporation (NFP MEDICAL CARE, INC.).
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The managers of these organizations reported that the not-for-profit founda-
tion raises funds from the public to support the not-for-profit hospital."' The
situation becomes more complicated because the not-for-profit hospital purchas-
es services from, and sends patients to, its for-profit subsidiaries. While these
transactions were described as arms-length,"' the tax-exempt hospital can use
money raised by the hospital foundation to purchase services from the for-profit
joint ventures at inflated prices.
II1. Policy Recommendations
Recent federal legislation, enacted to address the problem of physician joint
venture arrangements, prohibits physicians from referring Medicare patients to
health care businesses in which the physician or an immediate family member
has an investment interest." 2 Additionally, state lawmakers in Florida, Cali-
fornia, Tennessee, Maryland, and elsewhere are now considering legislation to
limit or ban physician joint ventures."'
This article presents data that show that, relative to other licensed health
care professionals, referring physicians are significantly more likely to choose
complex ownership structures. Our data, obtained in a recent survey in Florida,
demonstrate that complicated ownership structures are common and that such
structures make it difficult to identify the beneficial owners of health care
businesses. These results have important implications for policy makers who
must design regulations to address the problems associated with physician self-
referral.
If regulation is meant to restrict referrals to for-profit health care facilities,
then the legislation must clearly define investment interestq, ownership struc-
tures, and compensation relationships to include both direct and indirect owner-
ship arrangements. Failure to recognize indirect ownership and compensation
arrangements will limit the impact of any regulation that attempts to prohibit
the practice of self-referral. Florida recently adopted legislation which defines
"Investor" as "a person or entity owning a legal or beneficial ownership or
investment interest, directly or indirectly, including, without limitation, through
an immediate family member, trust, or another entity related to the investor
within the meaning of 42 C.F.R. § 413.17, in an entity.""' 4 This legislation
makes some progress towards recognizing the problem. However, we suggest
110. This information was received through confidential telephone conversations.
111. Id.
112. See Iglehart, supra note 6, at 1682.
113. See Pear, supra note 75.
114. See 1992 Fla. Laws, supra note 71, at § 7(3)(k)(4)(1); see also 42 C.F.R. § 413.7 (1991)
(regulations issued by Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) regarding reimbursement of costs for
treatment of end-stage renal diseases).
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that inserting the terms "holding company or subsidiary entity" after the word
"trust" would strengthen the wording.
Legislatures should refrain from setting a minimum ownership threshold
below which disclosure is not required. For example, Florida law previously
set an ownership threshold at 10%." This level was too high since ownership
share appears to have a negligible impact on whether physicians refer patients
to the health care facilities in which they have ownership interests. A small
slice of a very large compensation pie could influence referral practices even
though each individual physician owns only a "small" percentage share.
Physicians may refer patients to the business to generate larger profits even
though compensation paid to owners is not directly tied to the number of
referrals. One complex ownership arrangement described herein involves several
health care businesses and more than 100 physician owners, who each own less
than a 1% share of the parent corporation. The net effect of the complicated
ownership structure is that each physician owns less than .5% of each of the
operating companies. Aggregate profits such companies generate could reach
several million dollars per year and tens of thousands of dollars per physician.
Since the financing arrangements for joint ventures involve only nominal
investments by physicians and large amounts of borrowed funds, one could
conclude that the rate of return on physicians' actual investment is excessive.
In some states, existing regulations require disclosure of direct ownership.
However, for disclosure requirements to be effective, the physician-owner must
be required to disclose both indirect and direct ownership interests regardless
of share size. Disclosure of a seemingly insignificant ownership interest in a
health care facility could be misleading to patients. Patients, third-party payors,
and state authorities would find disclosure of the amount of the physician's
investments, aggregate profits of the businesses, and payments to the physician
owners to be more useful and informative.
Finally, legislation must address the problem of not-for-profit corporations
that are controlled by referring physician board members. Physicians can use
such corporations to generate profits by establishing a for-profit business that
is jointly owned by the not-for-profit corporation and by a for-profit corporation
the physician board members own. Funds that a tax-exempt foundation raises
to support a not-for-profit hospital can be used to purchase services from the
for-profit joint ventures at inflated prices. Such purchases increase the profits
the joint venture businesses generate and ultimately enrich the joint venture
owners.
Furthermore, since Medicare pays for outpatient services on a cost basis,
such ownership structures allow the hospital to allocate some of the overhead
115. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 458.327(2)(c) (Harrison Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 45 8 .3 3 1(1)(gg)
(Harrison Supp. 1991).
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costs of providing outpatient services to the Medicare program, thereby increas-
ing profits to the joint venture owners. In the arrangement described in Figure
B, for example, the not-for-profit home health agency served only Medicare
patients and the for-profit home health agency served only non-Medicare
patients. Overhead costs allocated to the not-for-profit Medicare agency were
proportionately higher than overhead costs allocated to the for-profit agency,
which increased profits at the for-profit agency. These arrangements call into
question the underlying reasonableness of preferential tax treatments currently
given to not-for-profit corporations.
Conclusion
Physician ownership of health care businesses to which the physician refers
patients has proliferated in recent years. These arrangements present conflicts
of interest and lead to over-utilization of services and higher health care
costs. Current legislation addresses this problem through regulation of direct
ownership by physicians. Our study, however, shows that indirect ownership
circumvents the intent of such legislation. In order to be effective, future laws
and regulations must explicitly address complex ownership structures.
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